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Abstract
A quantum key distribution scheme based on the use of squeezed states
is presented. The states are squeezed in one of two field quadrature com-
ponents, and the value of the squeezed component is used to encode a
character from an alphabet. The uncertainty relation between quadra-
ture components prevents an eavesdropper from determining both with
enough precision to determine the character being sent. Losses degrade
the performance of this scheme, but it is possible to use phase sensitive
amplifiers to boost the signal and partially compensate for their effect.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography provides a means of sending a secure message, and it
does this by allowing one to establish a secure key. In all but the simplest codes,
what is sent is not only the coded message, but also a key which tells the receiver
how to decode the message. The coded message can be sent through a public
channel, but the key must be sent through a secure one. Quantum mechanics
allows one to construct a channel in which the presence of an eavesdropper
can be detected [1]-[3]. The key can be sent through this channel, and if no
eavesdropping is found, the key will be secure. Working quantum cryptographic
systems have been constructed in several laboratories [4]-[8].
The quantum cryptographic schemes proposed so far have all involved the
transmission of single particles. For example, in one scheme, single photons are
sent down an optical fiber, and information is carried by the polarization of
the photons. Experimental implementations of this method use weak coherent
pulses rather than single photons. Losses limit the distances over which this
method can be used; if the fiber is too long, the probability of the photon
emerging from the fiber without being absorbed is small. Amplifiers cannot be
used to boost the signal, because they destroy the quantum coherence which is
essential for the method to work. A second approach, which also suffers from
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this limitation, uses weak, overlapping coherent states [9]-[11]. In this case, the
information is encoded in the phase of the coherent state.
One possible way around the limitation imposed by losses is to use pulses
consisting of more than one photon. Care, however, is required, because the
eavesdropper may siphon off enough of the pulse to learn what information it is
carrying, but send the rest of the pulse on its way. It has been shown by Ralph
that multiphoton pulses in coherent states are vulnerable to this kind of attack
[12]. It is necessary to use pulses for which this kind of eavesdropping will not
work.
Recently Ralph has presented a method of using squeezed states for quantum
cryptography [12]. In this scheme sequences of symbols are impressed on two
squeezed beams by Alice. The beams are then mixed at a beam splitter, and the
mixed beams, along with a local oscillator for each, is sent to Bob. A random
phase delay is introduced into one of the beams and its local oscillator in order to
destroy the phase coherence between the two beams. Bob, by using both beams
and their local oscillator signals, can, by using homodyne detections, recover
one of the two sequences but not both. An eavesdropper is in the same position
as Bob, but she does not know which sequence Bob will read, and if she uses
a capture-resend strategy, every time she guesses incorrectly, she will introduce
detectable errors. The squeezing prevents her from gaining useful information
by splitting off parts of the beams.
Here we shall investigate a different scheme based on squeezed light. Alice
sends displaced squeezed vacuum states to Bob which are squeezed in one of
two orthogonal field quadrature components. Bob chooses at random which of
the components to measure. The security of this method of transmission is a
result of the uncertainty relation for field quadrature components. The effect of
loss is examined, and it is found that its effect can be partially compensated by
using degenerate parametric amplifiers to boost the signal. This method should
be secure against the capture-resend strategy and a strategy which employs a
beam splitter to sample part of the signal. In the latter case, it is the vacuum
noise which presents a major problem for the eavesdropper.
2 Procedure
A single-mode classical field is characterized by a complex amplitude, or equiv-
alently, by its real and imaginary parts, which we shall designate by x1 and
x2, respectively. Quantum mechanically, the complex amplitude corresponds
to the mode annihilation operator, a, and the real and imaginary parts to the
operators X1 and X2, respectively, where
X1 =
1
2
(a† + a) X2 =
i
2
(a† − a). (1)
These operators do not commute and obey the uncertainty relation (h¯ = 1)
∆X1∆X2 ≥ 1
4
. (2)
2
This uncertainty relation implies that X1 and X2 cannot both be defined to
arbitrarily high accuracy for a given quantum state. Is is this fact which will
form the basis of our quantum cryptography system.
It is often useful to represent quantum states in a phase space whose axes
are x1 and x2. The state is pictured as a point surrounded by an error box. The
point is located at x1 = 〈X1〉 and x2 = 〈X2〉, and the error box represents the
fluctuations of the amplitude about its mean value. For a coherent state, the
error box is a circle of radius 1/2, while for a minimum uncertainty squeezed
state, it is an ellipse whose minor axis is parallel to the direction of the squeezing.
The area of the ellipse is the same as that of the circle. Its shape, however, allows
us to have one of the variables, say X1, very precisely defined, while the other,
X2, is very poorly defined.
In explaining how this can be used to send a message, we invoke the usual
cast of characters which appears in discussions of quantum cryptography, Alice,
Bob, and Eve. Alice wants to establish a key with Bob, and Eve wants to
intercept it without being detected. Alice and Bob use the following method
to set up a shared key. The x1 and x2 axes are divided up into bins of size δ,
where δ < 1/2. Each bin corresponds, by previous agreement, to a symbol in an
alphabet. The key will consist of a sequence of symbols from this alphabet. For
example, a not very efficient choice of alphabet would be would be the symbols 0
and 1, and every other bin could represent 0 while the intervening ones represent
1. A more efficient choice would be to use a larger alphabet.
Alice now sends to Bob one of two kinds of squeezed states. The first kind
can be represented by an ellipse which is centered on the x1 axis and is squeezed
in the x1 direction to a width considerably less than δ. This type of state has
very well-defined x1 value but a poorly defined x2 value. The second kind is
represented by an ellipse which is centered on the x2 axis and is squeezed in
the x2 direction, also to a width considerably less than δ. This state has a
well-defined x2 value but a poorly defined x1 value. We shall call the first kind
of state an x1 state and the second kind an x2 state.
The number of bins on each axis depends on the length of the ellipses. Let
δxmaj be the length of the major axis of the ellipses representing the x1 and x2
states (it is assumed to be the same for both). On the x1 axis, the bins run from
−δxmaj/2 to δxmaj/2, and have the same range on the x2 axis. This means
that the collection of all x1 states, each centered in a particular bin on the x1
axis, covers the same region of phase space as does the collection of x2 states.
Therefore, an eavesdropper cannot determine whether a state is an x1 or an x2
state from the result of a single measurement of X1 or X2.
Alice now decides at random whether to send an x1 or an x2 state, and Bob
decides, also at random, whether to measure X1 or X2. This measurement can
be performed by using homodyne detection. Alice and Bob then communicate
with each other via a public channel. For each state which Alice sent, she tells
Bob what kind of state, x1 or x2, it was, and Bob tells Alice what kind of
measurement he made. Alice does not tell Bob the X1 or X2 values of the
states she sent, and Bob does not tell Alice the results of his measurements.
After this public communication, Alice and Bob keep the results for which Bob
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made a measurement corresponding to the state which Alice sent, e. g. when
Alice sent an x1 state and Bob measured X1, and discard the others. For each
of these transmissions, Bob knows the value of the variable, x1 or x2, which
Alice sent so they both know which bin the state falls in. They then assign to
this transmission the alphabet symbol corresponding to this bin. The result is
a sequence of symbols which can be used as a key.
Why is this key secure? In order to know which bin a given state falls into,
Eve must be able to determine either x1 or x2 to an accuracy of at least δ.
The problem is, she does not know which measurement to make, and she is
forbidden by the uncertainty principle from measuring both to the necessary
accuracy. She must choose to measure X1 or X2 if she wishes to determine
the key symbol, and if she chooses the wrong one, she gains no information and
disturbs the message. This disturbance can be detected by Alice and Bob. They
can compare a subset of the transmissions for which they should agree. If they
find errors, i. e. if they find they do not agree on some of these symbols, they
can conclude there was an eavesdropper present.
Let us now see how small δ needs to be, and how much squeezing we need.
For a squeezed vacuum state, squeezed in the x1 direction, the probability dis-
tribution for the observable X1 is given by (see Appendix A)
p(x1) = 〈x1|ρsqvac|x1〉 = 1√
piv
e−x
2
1
/v, (3)
where ρsqvac is the density matrix corresponding to the squeezed vacuum state,
v = (1/2)e−2r, and r ≥ 0 is the squeezing parameter (r = 0 corresponds to the
vacuum state which is not squeezed). The probability, pδ, that x1 lies in the
interval [−δ/2, δ/2] is
pδ =
2√
piv
∫ δ/2
0
dx1e
−x2
1
/v = erf
(
δ
2
√
v
)
, (4)
where erf(x) is the error function and is given by
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
dte−t
2
. (5)
Suppose we want the probability of making an error, i. e. the probability of
finding x1 outside the inverval [−δ/2, δ/2], to be less than 10−3. We find that
1− erf(2.51) = 3.9× 10−4 [13], so that if
δ ≥ 5.02√v, (6)
then the error probability will be less than 10−3. If we choose δ to be 1/8, then
we can choose v = 6.2 × 10−4 which implies that the squeezing parameter is
3.3. Because the number of photons in a squeezed vacuum is 〈a†a〉 = sinh2 r,
the number of photons in this state is 200. The width of the state in the x2
direction is just er/2 which is, with our choices, 14, and this implies that in
that direction the state has substantial overlap with approximately 110 bins.
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This means that if we measure the state in the x1 direction we can determine
with very good probability which bin it lies in, but if it is measured in the x2
direction, the result is essentially random.
3 Effect of Losses
As the light travels down a fiber it will experience losses and this will degrade
the squeezing. These losses can be described by the master equation
dρ
dt
=
γ
2
(2aρa† − a†aρ− ρa†a). (7)
Here ρ is the density matrix of the field and γ is the loss rate. In order to find
the density matrix at the end of the fiber, one solves this equation for ρ(t) and
sets t = T = L/c, where L is the length of the fiber. There are a number of
ways to solve this equation one of which is discussed Appendix B. The result
for p(x1) at the output of the fiber is again given by Eq. (3), but now
v =
1
2
[(1− e−γT ) + e−γT e−2r]. (8)
The probability of finding x1 within a bin of size δ is still given by Eq. (4),
but with the new value of v. For a given value of pδ, or, equivalently, a given
error probability, this relation gives a bound on the size of the loss which can
be tolerated. Note that even if the initial squeezing were infinite (a physical
impossibility, because this would require infinite energy), the size of the accept-
able loss is finite, and, in fact, quite small. For example, for an error probability
of less than 10−3, with the same value of δ as above, we can again choose
v = 6.2× 10−4 which gives us that that γT < 1.2× 10−3 or for a fiber of length
one kilometer, a maximum loss of 1.2× 10−6 per meter.
It is possible to use a degenerate parametric amplifier to partially compensate
for the effect of losses. In order to see how this works, we shall compare the
action of a fiber of length L = Tc to that of two fibers of length L/2 with a
degenerate parametric amplifier, with gain G > 1, between them to boost the
signal. We shall consider what happens to an x1 state, the effect on an x2 state
is similar.
In the case of the fiber of length L we have that
〈X1(T )〉 = e−γT/2〈X1(0)〉,
∆X1(T )
2 = e−γT∆X1(0)2 +
1
4
(1− e−γT ). (9)
Because we wish to find which bin the initial state is in, we define a variable
ξ = eγT/2X1(T ) which has the property that
〈ξ〉 = 〈X1(0)〉,
∆ξ = [∆X1(0)
2 +
1
4
(eγT − 1)]1/2. (10)
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A measurement of ξ will tell us with high probability which bin the original
state was in if ∆ξ is considerably smaller than δ, or
∆ξ < sδ, (11)
where s < 1, and its actual size is determined by the probability of error which
we can tolerate. In order to satisfy this condition the loss must be such that
eγT − 1 ∼= γT < 4[(sδ)2 −∆X1(0)2]. (12)
Now let us look at the case with the amplifier. After the first fiber we have
〈X1(T/2)〉 = e−γT/4〈X1(0)〉,
∆X1(T/2)
2 = e−γT/2∆X1(0)2 +
1
4
(1 − e−γT/2). (13)
The amplifier can be set to amplify either X1 or X2; if it amplifies X1, then
X1 → GX1 and X2 → (1/G)X2, while if it is set to amplify X2, then X1 →
(1/G)X1 and X2 → GX2. Let us suppose that it is set to amplify X1 which has
the effect of multiplying the right-hand side of the first of Eqs. (13) by G and
the second by G2. Finally, after the second fiber we have
〈X1(T )〉 = Ge−γT/2〈X1(0)〉,
∆X1(T )
2 = G2e−γT∆X1(0)2 +
1
4
G2e−γT/2(1− e−γT/2)
+
1
4
(1 − e−γT/2). (14)
Again we are interested in the value of X1 at the beginning of the first fiber, so
we define
ξ1 =
1
G
eγT/2X1(T ), (15)
which implies that
〈ξ1〉 = 〈X1(0)〉,
∆ξ1 = [∆X1(0)
2 +
1
4
(eγT/2 − 1) + 1
4G2
eγT (1− e−γT/2)]1/2. (16)
In the limit of large gain, the requirement on the loss so that ∆ξ1 < sδ is that
(for γT ≪ 1)
γT < 8[(sδ)2 −∆X1(0)2], (17)
a less stringent requirement by a factor of two over the single long fiber. There-
fore, the amplifier, by boosting the signal, has reduced the effect of the losses.
It remains to be seen what happens if the amplifier is set to amplify X2, and
an x1 state is sent. In that case we define the variable
ξ2 = Ge
γT/2X1(T ), (18)
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which has the following properties:
〈ξ2〉 = 〈X1(0)〉,
∆ξ2 = [∆X1(0)
2 +
1
4
(eγT/2 − 1) + 1
4
G2eγT (1− e−γT/2)]1/2. (19)
In the high gain limit the requirement on the losses is
γT < 8
(sδ)2
G2
. (20)
This is a much more stringent requirement on the losses that that imposed by
the single long fiber.
This analysis suggests that Alice and Bob should use the following protocol
if a fiber with amplifiers is to be used. Alice decides at random whether to
send an x1 or an x2 state and independently decides, also at random, whether
the amplifiers should amplify X1 or X2. She then sends the state, and Bob
measures either X1 or X2, with this choice being again random. If Alice and
Bob make the same choice, and the amplifiers are set the same way, e. g. both
decide to measure X1 and the amplifiers also amplify X1, then they can use
that transmission, otherwise they discard it.
If the amplifier settings are secure, then this procedure can be simplified and
Alice can set the amplifiers in accord with the state she sends. On the other
hand, if they are not, and Eve knows which quadrature component is being
amplified, then the random setting is necessary. There is, in addition, a limit on
the gain of the amplifiers which follows from the fact that Alice and Bob must be
able to use the cases in which Alice’s preparation and Bob’s measurement agree,
but the amplifier is set incorrectly, to detect the presence of the eavesdropper.
If Alice and Bob can only use the cases in which everything agrees, prepara-
tion, amplifier setting, and measurement, to detect Eve, then she has a successful
eavesdropping strategy which cannot be detected. Eve simply determines which
quadrature is being amplified, measures that quadrature, and and sends a state
which agrees with the result of her measurement on to Bob. Using this strategy
Eve will only make incorrect measurements when the amplifier is set to am-
plify the wrong quadrature component, in which case that transmission will be
discarded anyway. Thus, it is essential that Alice and Bob be able to examine
the transmissions for which their preparation and measurement agree, but the
amplifier is set incorrectly, and see the effect of Eve’s measurement.
Let us now see what kinds of restrictions this requirement imposes. In the
case in which the amplifier is set properly, we want the third term in the brackets
in the second of Eqs. (16) to be much smaller than the other two. This implies
that we need
∆X1(0)
2 ≫ γT
G2
γT ≫ γT
G2
. (21)
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The second of these inequalities implies that we simply need G2 ≫ 1, and if
we assume that ∆X1(0) ∼ sδ, and in addition assume that the requirement
in Eq. (17) is obeyed, then the first of the above inequalities also reduces to
G2 ≫ 1. Now let us see what happens when the amplifier is set incorrectly.
With no intervention by Eve, we have that ∆ξ2 ∼ G. If, however, Eve makes an
incorrect measurement, then the uncertainty in the result of her measurement
will be of order 1/(sδ). This uncertainty will be reflected in the state she sends
to Bob, and consequently he will find ∆ξ2 ∼ 1/(sδ). If G is chosen so that
G2 ≫ 1 G≪ 1
sδ
, (22)
then even by examining the cases in which the amplifier is set incorrectly, Alice
and Bob can, by comparing their results, tell whether an eavesdropper was
present.
4 Eavesdropping
Let us now consider two possible methods of eavesdropping on this system. The
first is just the capture-resend strategy, and the second involves using a beam
splitter to split off part of the signal, and performing measurements on that
part to gain information about the signal. In both cases, we shall find that the
intervention of the eavesdropper is detectable.
In the capture-resend strategy, Eve measures the entire signal, and then, on
the basis of her measurement result, prepares a second state which she sends on
to Bob. Her problem is that she does not know whether she should measure X1
or X2, and, if δ is chosen small enough, she will introduce errors if she chooses
incorrectly.
If δ is chosen too large, in particular, larger than 1/2, Eve has a straightfor-
ward eavesdropping strategy. She can measure both X1 and X2 to an accuracy
of approximately 1/2. This can be accomplished either by splitting the signal
into two parts using a 50-50 beam splitter and measuring X1 at one output and
X2 at the other [14], or by amplifying the signal, so that it becomes essentially
classical, and performing measurements on it [15]. After performing these mea-
surements, she sends a coherent state to Bob which is centered on the results of
her measurement. That is, if she obtained results x
(m)
1 and x
(m)
2 , the coherent
state she sends can be visualized as a circle of radius 1/2 in the x1-x2 plane with
its center at the point (x
(m)
1 , x
(m)
2 ). When Alice announces which kind of state
she sent, Eve knows which of her results, x
(m)
1 or x
(m)
2 , to use, and Alice and
Bob will not be able to detect the eavesdropping. This is because the coherent
state which Eve sent to Bob will have the correct value of x1 for an x1 state and
the correct value of x2 for an x2 state, and both with sufficiently high accuracy
that Bob will assign the result of his measurement to the correct bin. Therefore,
it is necessary to choose δ smaller than 1/2 in order to foil this strategy.
If δ has been chosen considerably smaller than 1/2 the above strategy no
longer works, because Eve can no longer determine both X1 and X2 to the
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desired accuracy, i. e. δ. She will have to choose which to measure, and after
making the measurement, will send to Bob a state squeezed in the direction
which she chose centered on the result of her measurement. If, however, she
made the wrong choice, the state she sends to Bob will be squeezed in the
wrong direction and centered on the wrong point. This will introduce errors,
which, by comparing a subset of the results on which they agree, i. e. Bob’s
measurement corresponded to the kind of state which Alice sent, Alice and Bob
can detect the eavesdropping.
Let us now suppose that δ has been chosen sufficently small, and that instead
of measuring the entire signal, Eve uses a beam splitter to sample a part of it.
She sends on to Bob the part of the signal which is transmitted through the
beam splitter and performs measurements on the part which is reflected. We
would like to see how much she can learn, and how much she disturbs the signal
state. We shall call the two modes which the beam splitter couples modes 1 and
2, and the signal will go into the input port for mode 1 and the vacuum into the
input for mode 2. The relation between the input and output operators is [16](
a
(out)
1
a
(out)
2
)
= U−1
(
a
(in)
1
a
(in)
2
)
U =
( √
T
√
R
−√R √T
)(
a
(in)
1
a
(in)
2
)
, (23)
where U is the unitary operator which implements the beam-splitter transforma-
tion, and R and T are the reflection and transmission coefficients, respectively.
These have to be chosen in such a way that we minimize the disturbance to
the signal state, but, nevertheless, gain some information about it. We shall
suppose that Alice has sent an x1 state, and see what happens both in the case
Eve makes an X1 measurement and in the case she makes an X2 measurement.
Now suppose that Alice has sent an x1 state centered on x1 = s with squeez-
ing parameter r, and let σ = e−r. Eve inserts the beam splitter and measures
X1 at the mode 2 output port. We shall denote by Xjk the operator Xj for
the kth mode, where both j and k can be either 1 or 2. We shall also drop
the superscript (in) on all in operators with the understanding that operators
without a superscript are in operators. From Eq. (23) we have that for initially
uncorrelated modes
〈X(out)12 〉 =
√
T 〈X12〉 −
√
R〈X11〉
(∆X
(out)
12 )
2 = T (∆X12)
2 +R(∆X11)
2, (24)
or for our input state,
〈X(out)12 〉 = −
√
Rs
(∆X
(out)
12 )
2 =
1
4
(T +Rσ2). (25)
This last equation tells us about the information gain from Eve’s measurement.
In order to learn about Alice’s state with some degreee of accuracy, ∆X
(out)
12
cannot be too large which, in turn, implies that the reflection coefficient cannot
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be too small. If it is, the noise from the vacuum state obscures the information
carried by the signal state. In particular, if we define ξ12 = −X(out)12 /
√
R, then
we have
〈ξ12〉 = s
(∆ξ12)
2 =
1
4
(
T
R
+ σ2
)
. (26)
From this equation it is clear that if we want to determine x11 with an accuracy
of order δ, then we must have
√
T/R of order δ.
Let us now see what is the effect of Eve’s measurement on the transmitted
signal state. In the x1 representation the initial wave function of the system is
(see Appendix A)
|Ψ〉 = ψx1(x11)φvac(x12), (27)
where
ψx1(x11) =
(
2
piσ2
)1/4
e−[(x11−s)/σ]
2
, (28)
is the wave function of the x1 state,
φvac(x12) =
(
2
pi
)1/4
e−x
2
12 , (29)
is the wave function of the vacuum state, and x11 is the x1 coordinate for mode
1 and x12 is the x1 coordinate for mode 2. After the beam splitter the wave
function is (see Appendix A)
U |Ψ〉 =
(
2
piσ
)1/2
e−[(
√
Tx11−
√
Rx12−s)/σ]2e−(
√
Rx11+
√
Tx12)
2
. (30)
If Eve now measures X12 and obtains the result y, the wave function becomes a
product of a wave function in mode 1 and an “eigenstate” of X12 with eigenvalue
y in mode 2. The mode 1 wave function, ψy(x11) is then
ψy(x11) = N exp
[
−
(
T
σ2
+R
)(
x11 −
√
T (s+
√
R(1 − σ2)y)
T +Rσ2
)]
, (31)
where N is a normalization constant. This is the wave function which will be
sent on to Bob. Comparing Eqs.(28) and (31) we see that there are two effects
of the measurement on the wave function. First, the center of the Gaussian has
shifted, and, second, its width has changed. We want both of these changes to
be small.
As a result of the beam splitter and measurement, the width has changed
as follows:
σ → σ
(T + σ2R)1/2
. (32)
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In order for this change to be small, it is necessary that T be of order one. The
shift in the center of the Gaussian is given by
s→
√
T (s+
√
R(1− σ2)y)
T + σ2R
(33)
Note that if T = 1 the center suffers no shift while if T = 0 it is shifted all
the way to zero. This clearly implies that in order to produce a small change
we want T to be close to one. Assuming this to be the case, which means that
R≪ 1, and also that σ is small, we find that the shift, ∆s, is given by
∆s = −1
2
sR+ y
√
R. (34)
Now y is random, but will typically be of order −√Rs (see Eq. (25)) so that if
the shift is to be less than δ in magnitude, we must have
sR < δ. (35)
However, s can be anywhere between −1/σ and 1/σ, so that we need to require
that
R < σδ, (36)
which is a very stringent requirement.
Comparing the requirements for information gain and small disturbance, we
see that they are incompatible. Information gain requires a small transmission
coefficient, while a small disturbance requires a transmission coefficient close
to one, and there is no overlap in the permitted ranges. Therefore, using this
method, if Eve diverts enough light to gain useful information, she will also
produce a detectable disturbance. The real problem for Eve is the vacuum
noise. If she samples only a small part of the signal, in order to minimize the
disturbance, what little signal she sees is swamped by vacuum noise.
5 Conclusion
A method for using squeezed states to perform quantum key distribution has
been presented. It relies on the uncertainty relation for field quadrature compo-
nents for its security. As with other methods, it is adversely affected by losses,
but it is possible in this case to use amplifiers to reduce their effect. We have
shown that this method is secure against several eavesdropping strategies, but
have not presented a general proof of its security.
Squeezed states are an example of a nonclassical field state, that is a state
whose photodetection properties cannot be simulated by a classical stochastic
field. They have proven to be useful for teleportation [17]-[19] and now for
quantum cryptography as well. This leads one to ask whether other kinds of
nonclasical states could prove useful in quantum information, and suggests that
this should be a fruitful line of research.
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Appendix A
Here we present several facts about squeezed states and beam splitters which
are needed in the rest of the paper. Squeezed states are discussed in several
recent textbooks on quantum optics, and these provide a good background for
the subject [20, 21].
A squeezed vacuum state is obtained from the vacuum by applying the
squeeze operator
|Φ〉 = S(z)|0〉, (37)
where
S(z) = exp[(z(a†)2 − z∗a2)/2]. (38)
Setting z = reiφ we have that
S(z)−1aS(z) = a cosh r + a†eiφ sinh r
S(z)aS(z)−1 = a cosh r − a†eiφ sinh r. (39)
We can use these relations to find an explicit expression for |Φ〉 in the x1
representation, i. e. the representation of |Φ〉 given by 〈x1|Φ〉, where |x1〉 is an
eigenstate of X1. In this representation
X1 → x1 X2 → − i
2
d
dx1
, (40)
which implies that
a→ x1 + 1
2
d
dx1
a† → x1 − 1
2
d
dx1
. (41)
The state |Φ〉 satisfies the equation
S(z)aS(z)−1|Φ〉 = 0, (42)
and using Eqs. (39) and (41) to put this in the x1 representation we find
0 =
[
(cosh r − eiφ sinh r)x1
+
1
2
(cosh r + eiφ sinh r)
d
dx1
]
〈x1|Φ〉. (43)
This equation is easily solved, and in the case φ = pi, which corresponds to
squeezing in the x1 direction, we find, after normalization, that
〈x1|Φ〉 =
(
2
pie−2r
)1/4
exp[−(x1/e−r)2]. (44)
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In order to obtain the wave function of a squeezed vacuum state which has been
shifted by s in the x1 direction, we simply replace x1 by x1 − s in the above
equation.
Next we would like to see how wave functions in the x1 representation
are transformed under the action of a beam splitter. Let our initial state be
〈x11, x12|Ψ〉 = Ψin(x11, x12), then our task is to find
Ψout(x11, x12) = 〈x11, x12|UΨ〉, (45)
where U is the beam-splitter transformation given in Eq. (23). We first note
that U−1|x11, x12〉 is an eigenstate of U−1X11U with eigenvalue x11, and of
U−1X12U with eigenvalue x12. From Eq. (23) we have
U−1X11U =
√
TX11 +
√
RX12
U−1X12U = −
√
RX11 +
√
TX12, (46)
so that
U−1|x11, x12〉 = |
√
Tx11 −
√
Rx12,
√
Rx11 +
√
Tx12〉. (47)
Therefore, we have that
Ψout(x11, x12) = Ψin(
√
Tx11 −
√
Rx12,
√
Rx11 +
√
Tx12). (48)
Appendix B
We want to find the solution to the master equation, Eq. (7). There are
a number of ways of doing this, most of which involve turning the operator
equation into a c-number equation. We shall use the master equation to derive
an equation for the symmetrically-ordered field characteristic function, which
for a single-mode field is given by
χ(ξ) = Tr(D(ξ)ρ), (49)
where D(ξ) = exp(ξa† − ξ∗a). using the relations
∂χ
∂ξ
− 1
2
ξ∗χ = Tr(D(ξ)a†ρ)
∂χ
∂ξ
+
1
2
ξ∗χ = Tr(D(ξ)ρa†)
∂χ
∂ξ∗
+
1
2
ξχ = −Tr(D(ξ)aρ)
∂χ
∂ξ∗
− 1
2
ξχ = −Tr(D(ξ)ρa), (50)
we can transform the master equation into a partial differential equation for
χ(ξ)
∂χ
∂t
= −γ
2
(
ξ
∂χ
∂ξ
+ ξ∗
∂χ
∂ξ∗
+ |ξ|2χ
)
. (51)
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Defining χ′(ξ) = exp(|ξ|2/2)χ(ξ), we find that χ′(ξ) satisfies
∂χ′
∂t
= −γ
2
(
ξ
∂χ′
∂ξ
+ ξ∗
∂χ′
∂ξ∗
)
, (52)
whose solution is given by
χ′(ξ, t) = χ′(e−γt/2ξ, 0). (53)
This implies that
χ(ξ, t) = exp[−(1− e−γt)|ξ|2/2]χ(e−γt/2ξ, 0). (54)
Our next task is to relate the characteristic function to the x1 distribution
of the density matrix. If we let q and p be the real and imaginary parts of ξ,
ξ = q + ip, then
χ(ξ) = e−iqpTr(e2ipX1e−2iqX2ρ),
= e−iqp
∫
dx1e
2ipx1〈x1|e−2iqX2ρ|x1〉. (55)
Setting q = 0 we see that 〈x1|ρ|x1〉 is just the Fourier transform of χ(p), so
〈x1|ρ|x1〉 = 1
pi
∫
dpe−2ix1pχ(p). (56)
In order to find 〈x1|ρ(t)|x1〉 for an initial squeezed vacuum state, we first
use Eq. (55) and the results of Appendix A to find χ(p) at t = 0. We then use
Eq. (54) to find χ(p, t), and finally, Eq. (56) to find 〈x1|ρ(t)|x1〉.
References
[1] C. Bennett and G. Brassard in Proceedings of IEEE International Con-
ference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore, India
1984) p. 175.
[2] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991)
[3] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. Mermin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 557
(1992).
[4] C. Bennett, F. Bessettte, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, J. Cryptol. 5, 3 (1992).
[5] A. Muller, J. Breguet, N. Gisin, Europhys. Lett. 23, 383 (1993).
[6] J. Franson and H. Ilves, Appl. Opt. 33 2949 (1994).
[7] P. Townsend, Electron. Lett. 30, 809 (1994).
[8] R. J. Hughes, G. L. Morgan, and C. G. Glen, quant-ph/9904038.
14
[9] C. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[10] P. Townsend, J. Rarity, and P. Tapster, Electron. Lett. 29, 634 (1993).
[11] B. Huttner, N. Imoto, N. Gisin, and T. Mor, Phys. Rev. A 51, 1863 (1995).
[12] T. Ralph, quant-ph/9907073.
[13] Handbook of Mathematical Functions, Natl. Bur. Stand. Appl. Math. Ser.
No. 55, edited by M. Abramowitz and I. Stegun (U.S. GPO, Washington,
DC, 1970), p. 295.
[14] U. Leonhardt and H. Paul, Phys. Rev. A 47, 2460 (1993); 48, 4598 (1993).
[15] W. Schleich, A. Bandilla, and H. Paul, Phys. Rev. A 45, 6652 (1992).
[16] B. Yurke, S. McCall, and J. Klauder, Phys. Rev. A 33, 4033 (1986).
[17] S. Braunstein and H. Kimble, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 869 (1998).
[18] A. Furasawa, J. Sørensen, S. Braunstein, C. Fuchs, H. Kimble, and E.
Polzik, Science 282, 706 (1998).
[19] G. Milburn and S. Braunstein, Phys. Rev. A 60, 937 (1999).
[20] M. O. Scully and M. S. Zubairy, Quantum Optics (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1997), chapter 2.
[21] L. Mandel and E. Wolf, Optical Coherence and Quantum Optics (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), chapter 21.
15
